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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERMITTING
BLANKET STRIP-SEARCH POLICIES FOR ALL
ARRESTEES ENTERING GENERAL JAIL
POPULATION-FLORENCE V BOARD OF
CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF BURLINGTON

COUNTY, 621 F.3D 296 (3D CIR. 2010)
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prevents
government officials from executing unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The Supreme Court has established that enforcing a policy to strip-search
all inmates after contact visits is permissible under the Fourth Amendment,
however, the circuit courts are split as to whether a similar policy is
constitutional for all arrestees entering the general jail population. 2 In
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County,3 the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether a
policy to strip-search all arrestees, regardless of offense, was
constitutional. 4 The Third Circuit held that a blanket policy to strip-search
all incoming inmates was constitutionally permissible because a prisons'
security interests trumped the privacy interests of the inmates.5
On March 3, 2005, a New Jersey State Trooper stopped a vehicle
in which Albert Florence was a passenger.6 The trooper arrested Florence
pursuant to a bench warrant for a non-indictable form of civil contempt,
previously issued on April 25, 2003. 7 Florence protested his arrest to the
I

U.S. CONST.

2

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979) (stating Fourth Amendment prohibits only

amend. IV.

unreasonable searches and seizures). Compare Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 982
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding blanket policy to strip-search all incoming arrestees constitutional), and

Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding blanket strip-search policy for
arrestees permissible), with Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1996) (requiring reasonable
suspicion to strip-search those arrested for minor offenses), and Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d
1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting need for reasonable suspicion to strip-search traffic violation
arrestees). In Afasters, the court stated that officials may not strip-search incoming arrestees
solely because the arrestees will mingle with the general jail population. 872 F.2d at 1255.
Prison officials must have a reasonable belief that the prisoner will smuggle contraband into the
jail. Id.
3 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (April 4, 2011).
4 Id. at 298.
5 Id. at311.
6 Id. at 299
7

(detailing arrest).
Id. (describing warrant and charge).
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officer and claimed that he had paid the fine.8 The trooper took Florence9
into custody and transported him to the Burlington County Jail ("BCJ").
After six days of detention, Florence was transferred to Essex County
Correctional Facility ("ECCF"). l
During intake at BCJ and ECCF, corrections officers performed a
strip-search and body-cavity search on Florence." At BCJ, Florence was
directed to remove all of his clothing, open his mouth and lift his tongue,
lift his arms and turn around, and lift his genitals while an officer
observed.12 At ECCF, officers directed Florence and four other inmates to
strip naked and shower in separate stalls.' 3 While Florence showered, a
corrections officer looked on and informed Florence to open his mouth, lift
his genitals, and then turn around, squat, and cough. 14 The charges against
Florence were dismissed the following day and, after his release, he
brought this action against BCJ and ECCF for violating his Fourth
Amendment rights. " The district court granted summary judgment for
Florence but certified its order for appeal. 16
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures
that government officials do not perform unreasonable searches and
seizures against or upon citizens of the United States. 17 The Constitution's
8 Florence, 621

F.3d at 299.
9 See id. (describing transportation to jail).
10 Id.
11 See id. (recounting intake procedure).
12 Id. During this time, the corrections officer sat approximately an arm's length away from
Florence. Id. The officer directed Florence to take a shower at the end of the search. Id.
13 Florence, 621 F.3d at 299. These events occurred under the "watchful eyes" of two
corrections officers. Id.
14 Id. (detailing strip-search).
15 Id. at 299-300 (describing release and complaint). The district court certified Florence's
motion for class certification, which was defined as follows:
"[a]ll arrestees charged with non-indictable offenses who were . . .housed . . . at
Defendant Burlington County Jail and/or Defendant Essex County Correctional
Facility . ..who were directed by Defendants' officers to strip naked before those
officers ... without the officers first articulating a reasonable belief that those arrestees
were concealing contraband, drugs or weapons[.]"
Id. (alteration in original).
16 Id. at 300-01 (detailing procedural history). The question certified by the district court for
review by Third Circuit was "'whether a blanket policy of strip -searching all non-indictable
arrestees admitted to a jail facility without first articulating reasonable suspicion violates the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution."' Id. at 301 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, 657 F. Supp. 2d 504, 511 (D.N.J. 2009)).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons.., against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
").Government officials are held to
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application in prisons has changed as the judiciary's approach has evolved
from "hands off' to a model based on deference to the judgment of prison
administrators. 8 The applicable precedent governing this case clearly
states that inmates do not lose their constitutional rights upon entering
prison; their rights, however, are not as extensive as those possessed by the
ordinary citizen. 19 Inmates' rights are limited because prisons are unique
institutions fraught with inherent dangers. 20
The tension between
protecting constitutional rights and preventing inherent danger within a
prison requires a careful balancing of inmate rights and institutional
objectives. 21 A court must balance the fact that prison management is the

a standard of reasonableness in order to avoid arbitrary invasions of a citizen's privacy. See
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (noting Court consistently holds Fourth
Amendment exists to protect privacy of individual).
18

See Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a Mutual

Accommodation, 1992 BYU L. REv. 857, 858 (1992) (describing evolution of judicial treatment
of prisoner rights). Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) ("When accommodation
of an asserted right will have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff,
courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials."), with
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1980) (holding involuntary transfer of inmate to mental
facility violated Due Process Clause of Fourth Amendment), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547 (1979) ("Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies ....), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)
([T]here must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the
provisions of the Constitution ....), and Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796
(1871) (stating inmates are "slaves of the State" and power to regulate is in State's hands).
19 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (declaring prisoners' rights limited by
institutional objectives); Wolff 418 U.S. at 555 (stating prisoner not stripped of constitutional
protections in jail). The Court explained that "no iron curtain [is] drawn" between the
Constitution and prisons. Wolff 418 U.S. at 555-56. Specifically, inmates possess constitutional
rights insofar as those rights are compatible with the goals of incarceration. See Hudson, 468
U.S. at 523 (describing fundamental prisoners' rights); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 491-92 (1973) (determining relationship between inmate and State more intimate than
relationship between State and private citizen). The judiciary initially considered inmates
"slave[s] of the State" but has slowly altered its perception to create a sphere of prisoner rights.
See Gutterman, supra note 18, at 858-59 (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.)
790, 796 (Va. 1871)) (describing development of prisoner's rights in courts).
20 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (stating prisons are "fraught with serious security dangers").
One of the chief problems prisons face is the smuggling of contraband by defendants; this
accomplishment is often achieved by defendants concealing contraband in body cavities during
contact visits. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003) (noting drug smuggling is
serious problem in prisons); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) (declaring contact
with visitors poses risk of smuggling contraband into prison); Bell, 441 U.S. at 559
(acknowledging instances of smuggling in body cavities); United States v. Park, 521 F.2d 1381,
1382 (9th Cir. 1975) (describing visitor's attempt to smuggle valium tablets in vaseline coated
balloon).
21 See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524; Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 (finding prisoner rights may
be
subject to limitations to maintain institutional security); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948) (noting goals of incarceration justify limitations of rights), abrogated by McCleskey v.
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province of the executive and legislative branches with the knowledge that
prisoners cannot address their grievances at the ballot box but must use the
courts .22

The Court in Bell v. Wolfish, examining the legality of body cavity
searches after contact visits, noted that a court must consider "the scope of
the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. 23 The
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have applied the Bell test and held that blanket
strip-search policies during booking were constitutional. 24 The First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have addressed this issue
and found strip-searches unconstitutional under Bell.25 To satisfy Fourth
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 483 (1991) (stating Price erred regarding weight given to three prior refusals
of discharge in disposition of prisoner's fourth).
22 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 548 ("[T]he operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the
province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial."). But
see Gutterman, supra note 18, at 898-99 (noting prisoners may only rely on courts to correct
violations of rights). Deference to prison officials results in control for prison officials, who then
defer supervisory control to guards, thereby making guards the final adjudicator of prisoner
rights. Id. at 900. If courts do not correct this situation, they encourage violation of the prisoner
rights they refuse to recognize. Id. at 900-01.
23 441 U.S. at 559. Bell addressed procedures at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
("MCC") of New York City. Id. at 523. The MCC faced issues of overcrowding as a result of an
increased number of pretrial detainees, requiring single rooms to serve as doubles and the
placement of cots in common areas for multiple inmates. Id. at 525-26. In light of its test, the
Court held that body-cavity searches in this instance were constitutionally permissible. Id. at 560.
The dissent noted that the Bell test, as applied, permits limitations on detainee rights in whatever
way correction officials decide is appropriate. Id. at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Further, such
invasions of privacy should not be sanctioned against presumptively innocent individuals. Id.
24 See Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010); Powell v. Barrett, 541
F.3d 1298, 1300 (1 lth Cir. 2008). Specifically, the court in Bull reviewed empirical evidence of
attempts to smuggle contraband during booking but ultimately refused to rely on it, stating no
empirical evidence was necessary. 595 F.3d at 982. Instead, the court relied on testimony of
corrections officers stating that they believed the best opportunity to smuggle contraband into the
prison was during booking. Id. at 967. But see Andrew A. Crampton, Note, Stripped of
Justification: The Eleventh Circuit's Abolition of the Reasonable Suspicion Requirement for
Booking Strip Searches in Prisons, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 893, 918 (2009) (noting relatively low
occurrence of arrestees smuggling contraband during bookings). The Eleventh Circuit addressed
only strip-searches where inmates were nude and whose front and backsides were examined.
Powell, 541 F.3d at 1313 n.6 (describing manner of strip-searches). The court stated that the
factual circumstances were similar to Bell and, therefore, a blanket policy was justified. Id. at
1302. But see id. at 1318 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating majority's opinion concerning risk of
smuggling by arrestees was "unwarranted speculation"); see also Crampton, supra, at 918
(describing low incidence of smuggling during booking).
25 See, e.g., Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging lack of notice of
arrest diminishes ability to smuggle contraband); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 111 (1st
Cir. 2001) (stating Bell test frowns on strip-searches of "far less dangerous inmates"); Kelly v.
Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1996) (requiring "reasonable suspicion" inmate is hiding weapons
or contraband to strip-search minor offenders); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir.
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Amendment concerns, the majority of the circuit courts have required
reasonable suspicion for corrections officials to strip-search arrestees. 26
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that it has a limited role in
prison management. 2 7 The Court has noted, however, that the judiciary
should no longer take a deferential stance when substantial evidence exists
that corrections officials are overreacting to institutional needs. 2 Stripsearches have been described as one of the most invasive intrusions to a
person's privacy, leading some detainees to commit suicide as a result.2 9
1989) (holding need for reasonable belief of smuggling to strip-search those arrested for traffic
violations); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding violation of leash
law did not permit strip-search under Bell); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981)
(holding indiscriminate strip-search policy for all detainees cannot be upheld). In Roberts, the
First Circuit required officers to have "reasonable suspicion" prior to conducting a strip -search for
the following reasons: (1) that the Bell test frowns upon a gross invasion of privacy because of
the low risk of smuggling subsequent to arrest; ( 2) the deterrent effect of strip-searches because
arrests are generally unplanned and; (3) a reasonable suspicion standard provided an apt way to
discover contraband. 239 F.3d at 111-12.
26 See, e.g., Kelly, 77 F.3d at 821 (requiring "reasonable suspicion that [prisoner] is hiding
weapons or contraband"); Afasters, 872 F.2d at 1255 (requiring reasonable belief of smuggling);
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding Fourth Amendment requires reasonable
suspicion that arrestee is hiding weapons or contraband); see also Bull, 595 F.3d at 990 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (noting quarter-century of Ninth Circuit law required reasonable suspicion);
Powell, 541 F.3d at 1317 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting Bell should not be read to mean
reasonable suspicion not required). The "reasonableness" requirement exists to ensure that
government officials have adequate justification that can be reviewed by a court. See Gabriel M.
Helmer, Note, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Casefor Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U.

L. REv. 239, 242-43 (2001). Reasonable suspicion is the "most clearly defined ... tool to assess
the constitutional validity of a strip search ....
Id. at 288. Justice Powell's dissent in Bell noted
that reasonable suspicion should be the standard for corrections officers when deciding to stripsearch a detainee. See 441 U.S. 520, 563 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Helmer, supra, at 265 (describing adoption of reasonable suspicion in the Ninth
Circuit).
27 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576, 584 (1984) (reaffirming limited role of judiciary in prison management); Bell, 441 U.S. at
547 (stating prison administrators should be provided wide-ranging deference to deal with
management matters). The separation of powers doctrine requires judicial deference because
prison management lies within the province of the executive and legislative branches. See Bell,
441 U.S. at 548 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)) (stating underlying
principles of judicial deference to corrections officials).
28 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 827) (noting jails afforded
deference absent substantial evidence that officials overreacted to security considerations); see
also David C. James, Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM.

L. REv. 1033, 1056 (1982) (stating privacy rights of inmates meaningless if corrections officials
afforded broad discretion).
29 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 (stating strip-searches "instinctively give[] [the Court] the most
pause"); United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting strip-searches are
"significant intrusion" of individual's privacy); see also M. Margaret McKeown, Strip Searches
Are Alive and Well in America, HUM. RTS. Spring 1985, at 37, 42 available at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Pagehandle=hein.jounals/huril2&div=42&gsent= 1&collection=jou
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Judges and researchers have also noted the minimal threat that arrestees
and pretrial detainees pose to smuggling contraband into prisons. 3
In Florence,the Third Circuit considered whether strip-searches of
all arrestees entering a general jail population are permissible under the
Fourth Amendment. 3' Joining the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the court
held that the strip-searches were reasonable because the jail's interest in
maintaining security outweighed the privacy interest of the inmates. 32 The
court first assumed that prisoners retain some constitutional rights in
prisons and stated that strip-searches are considerable invasions on
individual privacy.33 The court then discussed the Bell factors and noted
that the searches before the court were less intrusive than those considered
in Bell.3 4 The court moved to the second and fourth factors, finding that
strip-searches occurred in a similar place and manner as those in Bell.35
rnals (noting traumatic effect of strip-searches); James, supra note 28, at 1049 (describing
detrimental psychological effects of strip-searches).
Psychologists have noted senses of
helplessness and indignity in subjects after strip-searches resulting in a number of instances of
suicide. See McKeown, supra, at 42. Women who have been questioned about the psychological
effects of a strip-search have compared it to rape and state that they "hesitate to participate in
normal sexual relations afterwards." Pamela Ellis Simons, Strip Search: The Abuse of Women in
Police Stations, Barrister, Summer 1979, at 8, 56 (1979) available at http://www.heinonline.org/
HOL/Pagehandle=hein.jourals/barraba6&id= 1&size=2&collection=journals&index journals/
barraba.
30 See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1318 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating majority's
opinion
concerning risk of smuggling by arrestees is "unwarranted speculation"); Shain v. Ellison, 273
F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (unplanned nature of arrest generally does not allow arrestees to hide
contraband); Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 (lacking notice of arrest means arrestees do not have
opportunities to hide things). Studies have noted that prison staff and visitors, not inmates, are
the most likely sources for drug smuggling. See WWLIAM R. BELL, PRACTICAL CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 8-14 (2002) (citing visitors as one of main
avenues for contraband in prisons); MARK S. FLEISHER & RICHARD H. RISON, Gang
Management in Corrections, in PRISON AND JAIL ADMIN. PRACTICE AND THEORY 232, 234-35
(Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett eds., 1999) (stating jailed gang members recruit people
outside prison to smuggle contraband through visits); Dennis J. Stevens, Prison Regime and
Drugs, 36 HOw. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 25 (1997) (stating inmates unlikely vehicle to smuggle drugs).
A study of convicted drug smugglers noted most drugs found in prisons are smuggled via prison
staff members. See Stevens, supra.
31 621 F.3d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (April 4, 2011)
(describing question presented).
32 Id. at 308 ("Like the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals . . . [w]e reject
Plaintiffs' argument that blanket searches are unreasonable .....
33 Id. at 307 (discussing foundation of court's reasoning).
34 Id. at 308 (distinguishing Florence's search from searches in Bell). The court stated that
the searches only required a visual inspection of the arrestees' nude bodies while Bell required a
body-cavity search. Id. at 307-08. The primary force of the court's reasoning involved a
discussion of the Bell factors, along with distinguishing the facts at bar from those in Bell. Id. at
308-10.
35 Id. at 307 (discussing circumstances of strip-search). The court stated that the search
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The court finally addressed the justification for initiating the
search, the third factor of the Bell test, and stated that the potential for
inmates to smuggle drugs, weapons, and other contraband was the greatest
threat to security facing prisons.3 6 Relying again on the Bell decision, the
court reasoned that non-indictable arrestees could not be considered a
lesser security risk than other inmates. 3 7 The court relied on its conclusion
that a person may get arrested on purpose for a non-indictable offense in
order to take advantage of a procedure where non-indictable arrestees were
not strip-searched.38 The plaintiffs contended that no evidence existed of a
smuggling threat from non-indictable arrestees, but the court stated it was
unnecessary because Bell did not require such evidence.39 The court finally
stated that a blanket policy removes discretionary authority from
corrections officers, ensuring similar treatment of all arrestees and
therefore easing equal protection concerns. 40 For the foregoing reasons, the
Third Circuit held that a blanket strip-search policy for all arrestees
entering the general jail population was constitutional. 41
In the instant case, the Third Circuit improperly deferred to the
judgment of prison officials where ample evidence exists of the
impropriety of blanket strip-search policies. 42 While smuggling in prisons
is a serious issue that must be dealt with by prison officials, a strip-search is
displayed less intrusiveness than that in Bell because it lasted only a few minutes, it was
conducted in private, and it was performed in a professional manner. Id.
36 Florence, 621 F.3d at 307 (noting security interest of prisons). The security interest of the
prison was the only fact that the court believed the plaintiffs could reasonably distinguish from
the facts in Bell. Id. The court found that preventing smuggling of contraband was a legitimate
security interest because it was necessary to protect both inmates and security personnel. Id.
37 Id. at 308 (noting Bell court refused to use grounds for detention as indicator when strip search proper).
38 Id. (dismissing plaintiffs' argument that non-indictable arrestees are minimal threat to
smuggle). Noting the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, the Third Circuit agreed that gang members
would likely seek to exploit non-indictable arrestee status as not included in blanket search
policies. Id. The court also stated that the risk of smuggling in Bell was low, as it would be hard
to smuggle through contact visits when in full view of prison officials, and the policy was still
upheld. Id. at 309.
39 Id. (stating why actual evidence is unnecessary). The Supreme Court has a long-standing
policy of deferring to the corrections officials' authority, and the court noted that policy made the
lack of evidence reasonable. Id. at 310.
40 Id. at 310-11 (stating positive aspects of blanket policy). The court stated that the use of a
reasonable suspicion standard to determine who should undergo a strip -search would have a high
potential for abuse. Id. The court further noted that a majority of its sister courts apply a
reasonable suspicion standard. Id. at 304 n.4.
41 Florence, 621 F.3d at 311.
42 See id. at 308 (following the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and holding blanket policies
constitutionally permissible); supra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text (stating deference to
prison officials is unwarranted in certain circumstances).
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one of the most invasive procedures to a person's privacy, and can subject
victims to serious psychological damage. 43 The court attempted to balance
these concerns but failed to note that incoming arrestees are unlikely
vehicles for smuggling contraband.44 As a result, the application of these
polices will require the strip-searches of both the convicted drug trafficker
and the person arrested for failing to leash a dog.
The Florence court also incorrectly interpreted Bell when it stated
that the justifications for each search were similar.46 The Florence court
assumes from Bell that no evidence of smuggling is necessary, although
Bell noted instances of smuggling were in the record. 4 Furthermore, there
is outside evidence that prisoners utilize contact visits to smuggle
contraband while there is not similar evidence regarding incoming arrestees
like those in Florence.48 Therefore, under the Bell analysis, justification is
lacking, as the threat of smuggling by incoming arrestees is low. 49 Still,

Bell should have guided the Florence court, but only to the extent that the
43 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing possible psychological effect of
strip-searches). One study noted that women who were strip-searched are left with similar
psychological effects as rape victims. See Simons, supra note 29, at 8, 56.
44 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (stating reason justifying strip-searches is

unwarranted).
45 See Florence, 621 F.3d at 299 (summarizing circumstances of arrest and strip-search);
Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1985) (describing strip-search after arrest for
violation of leash law). In Jones, the arrestee was held for failing to abide by a leash law for his
dog and was strip-searched while waiting for a friend to post bail. 770 F.2d at 740.
46 See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text (stating court found similar justification for
search). The court stated that non-indictable arrestees could not be considered a lesser security
because, hypothetically, gang members would seek to use their exclusion from strip -searches to
smuggle contraband.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing the court's
reasoning). But see Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting) ("[The] assertion that pretrial detainees booked on petty misdemeanor charges might
anticipate their arrests or that gang members might deliberately get arrested in order to smuggle
weapons and drugs into jail is unwarranted speculation ... ").
47 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (stating smuggling through body cavities during contact visits in
record and other cases); see also supra note 30 (stating prisoners are unlikely avenues to smuggle
drugs upon arrest).
48 See BELL, supra note 30 (stating staff and visitors used most often to smuggle
contraband); FLEISHER & RISON, supra note 30 (noting use of contact visits to smuggle
contraband). Studies and evidence point to the conclusion that incoming arrestees are one of the
least likely methods for smuggling contraband into prisons. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text (stating incoming arrestees rarely used to smuggle contraband).
49 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (stating justification requirement). In Bell, the Court looked at
evidence of smuggling through contact visits in the record and the one noted instance at the
Metropolitan Correction Center. Id. The justification for the search in Florence was a
hypothetical of what may occur and does not live up to the justification set forth in Bell. See id.
(stating justification); Florence, 621 F.3d at 308 (relying on llth Circuit's hypothetical
conclusion that gang members would exploit the search exclusion).
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court should not defer to the opinion of the corrections officials because
substantial evidence exists that they are overreacting to security concerns.50
Finally, the Florence court mistakenly chose deference to prison
officials instead of applying the reasonable suspicion standard like the
majority of its sister courts. 5' As Justice Powell noted in his dissent in Bell,
reasonable suspicion satisfies the need for a level of cause to strip-search a
detainee.5 2 The Florence court stated that a unified procedure took
discriminatory power away from prison staff, but failed to see that
deference to the judgment of those officials gave them the power to
interpret the Fourth Amendment for prisoners.53 In the absence of evidence
indicating smuggling by incoming arrestees, the Fourth 5Amendment
may
4
policies.
strip-search
blanket
allow
to
enough
not bend far
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Burlington, the Third Circuit decided that a blanket strip-search policy for
all incoming inmates is constitutional. However, there was a lack of
supporting evidence aside from the affirmations of prison officials that
incoming arrestees will try to smuggle contraband during booking. Ample
evidence exists to the contrary, including a poll of convicted drug
traffickers that identified prison staff as the most likely vehicles for
smuggling contraband. The Third Circuit broke off from a majority of the
other circuits, which state reasonable suspicion is necessary to strip-search
detainees in light of the Fourth Amendment. Prisons are fraught with
security concerns, but the Third Circuit incorrectly deferred to the expertise
of prison officals in matters considered so humiliating and invasive, likened
to rape, where evidence exists contrary to the officials' story. Prisoners
may lack some of the constitutional protections possessed by ordinary

50

See Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)) (noting

jails afforded deference absent substantial evidence that officials overreacted to security
considerations); supra note 30 (noting substantial evidence concluding incoming arrestees are a
low threat).
51 See supra note 28 (stating where evidence exists that prison officials overreacted, courts
do not give deference). The Sixth Circuit specifically stated that absent a reasonable belief that a
person will smuggle contraband, the fact that a prisoner will enter the general jail population is
not enough cause to search a detainee. Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989).
52 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
some level of cause is needed); see also Helmer, supra note 26, at 265 (arguing reasonable
suspicion is most well-developed tool to determine constitutionality of blanket strip-search).
53 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating deference allows detainee
rights to go only as far as corrections officers like); Gutterman, supra note 19, at 900 (stating
guards become final adjudicators of prisoners' rights through deference); see also Powell v.
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1315 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating deference due but it does not mean
prisoners give up their constitutional rights).
54 See supra notes 23, 26 and accompanying text.
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citizens, but the Third Circuit has created a precedent that puts the extent of
those protections in the hands of jailors. The blanket strip-search policies
before the court were a clear instance where the deference to prison
officials should break down and be substituted by the judgment of the
Third Circuit concerning Fourth Amendment protections.
Michael Beler

